



# Youth and employment opportunities in Myanmar

April 2023



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**Citation of the report in APA format:**

Thutanyana. (2023). *Youth and employment opportunities in Myanmar*.  
[https://thutanyana.org/wp-content/uploads/Youth\\_employ\\_opp\\_200423.pdf](https://thutanyana.org/wp-content/uploads/Youth_employ_opp_200423.pdf)

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
## Present Myanmar

### *Last decade*

Myanmar, one of the least developed countries in South-East Asia (SEA), was in democratic transition during the last decade. Despite some challenges such as domestic armed conflicts with some ethnic groups, bureaucracy, and corruption, it is successfully led by the two democratically elected governments from 2011 to 2020. Nonetheless on February 1, 2021, just before the new Hluttaw (Parliament) and third term of government which was elected by the general election in 2020 is scheduled to swear in, it has fallen again under the military coup (Ratcliffe, 2022). The excuse of the coup given by the military was reported as ‘terrible’ voting fraud during the 2020 election (Goodman, 2021).

### *After February 2021*

Right after the coup, the military regime faced a fierce and widespread public protest all over the country. Many governmental staff also showed their resentment by refusing going to work, the activity was known as Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) (Walker, 2021). The popular protests later shifted to armed resistance in many areas. The parallel government called National Unity Government (NUG) was formed by newly elected Hluttaw members and members of the election-winning National League for Democracy (NLD) party. It also established the People’s Defence Force (PDF) which made alliances with other Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAO) that have been resisting the military for more than seven decades since right after its Independence Day in 1948. The EAO and PDF challenge the military regime in many parts of the country, especially in the dry zone and border areas controlled by ethnic groups. From the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), the trends of conflict intensity of Myanmar from December 2018 to December 2022 are seen in Figure 1.



**Figure 1 Conflict intensity in Myanmar** (Data source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) (Note: The North West includes Sagaing, Magway, Chin, and Kachin. The South East includes Kayin, Kayah, Mon, and Tanintharyi. Others include Ayeyarwady, Bago, Nay Pyi Taw, and Shan. Conflict intensity is calculated as a geometric mean of events and fatalities. Events include battles, explosions, and remote violence, protests, riots, and violence against civilians. Fatalities represent the total fatalities resulting from each event.)

# 14.4 million

## People in need of humanitarian assistance

(Source: Myanmar Emergency (<https://www.wfp.org/emergencies/myanmar-emergency>))

### *Current status of Myanmar*

Under the military regime, it suffers a setback in every aspect. The economic, educational, social and internal stability are also hard hit, while all had already been disrupted during the global pandemic, COVID-19 period since early 2020.


Literally, Myanmar is not in double but triple crisis (Middle East Institute, 2021); it is under the impact of COVID-19, complication of military coup, and paralysed economy because of international sanction, inflation and poor manufacturing sector. During 2021, the Gross Domestic Production (GDP) of Myanmar fell drastically, -5.9%, and the inflation rate was 3.6% but it would sharply rise up to a two digit figure, 16% in 2022 according to Asia Development Bank (ADB) estimation (2022). The poverty of Myanmar is estimated to rise up to more than 50% in early 2022 while it was only 25% before COVID-19 period (UNDP, 2021). In brief, the various constraints and changes in policy after the coup make the Myanmar economy still in trouble to fully recover (World Bank, 2022a).

# 13.2 million


## Food-insecure people

(Source: Myanmar Emergency. <https://www.wfp.org/emergencies/myanmar-emergency>)

**Table 1 The GDP of Myanmar estimated by ADB (from 2019 to 2023)**



**Table 2 The inflation rate of Myanmar estimated by ADB (from 2019 to 2023)**




### Unemployment status

The Inter-censal Survey in 2019 (Department of Population, 2020), reported that among the working-age group (above 15), 38.5% were either unemployed or were out of the labour force. The unemployment rate among persons aged 15 years and over was 2.7% at the national level, the difference of unemployment rates between urban and rural areas was minimal, 2.6% vs 2.7%.

Likewise, International Labour Organisation (ILO) (2022) reports that Myanmar is hard hit by rising loss of labour force in the first six months of 2022. Compared to 2020, it loses about 1.6 million jobs for men and women. The unemployment rate is much lower than 2020 and the more women (2.5%) (Figure 2) suffered the loss of jobs compared to men (2%) (Figure 3).



**Figure 2 The unemployment rate of female (% of female labour force) (modeled ILO estimate) in Myanmar (ILO)** (Data source: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.FE.ZS?end=2021&locations=MM&start=1991&view=chart>)



**Figure 3 The unemployment rate of male (% of male labour force) (modeled ILO estimate) in Myanmar (ILO)** (Data source: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.MA.ZS?end=2021&locations=MM&start=1991&view=chart>)

*“The military takeover and COVID-19 pandemic have put millions of workers in Myanmar in a grim situation. We are witnessing a reversal of years of progress in the labour market. Should this continue, it can only lead to increased poverty and insecurity across the country.”*

*Mr Donglin Li, ILO Myanmar Liaison Officer/Representative (ILO, 2022)*

## Myanmar youth

### *Definition and status of youth*

The definition of youth in Myanmar is varied based on the applying organisations. For instance, adults between 15 to 35 defined by Myanmar government's Youth Policy (Burma Library, 2018) or an adult **between 15 to 24 years of age (UNICEF), (youth programmes of various non-governmental organisations) (U Report) is determined as 'youth'**. This age group belongs to either attending the school either high school, higher educational institutes (Colleges/Universities) or employed (private or government employees) or self-employed status. However, many youth of Myanmar cannot obtain any college diploma or University graduate or even diploma certificate. Many are school drop-out during primary, middle or high school level. A local economic study indicated that the family economic hardship is one of the major factors forcing children out of school in Myanmar (Nilar and Aung, 2019).

### *Current status of youth*

Because of disruption in the education system due to COVID-19 and military coup, many youth are not back to school when schools, colleges and Universities reopen in 2022 under the control of the military. They become school drop-out and go into the workplace, or join PDF to confront the military regime instead. Many civil servants from Government Ministries and some staff are under CDM. That caused the military regime to face difficulty in running governmental management with the remaining non-CDM employees.

## Employment opportunities

Every youth who would like to start a career, needs to consider first the chosen career has an openly available and easy to obtain a paid position or initiate a self-employed business. It can be generally understood as an employment opportunity. Some employments may have difficulty getting a targeted position or self-employed. Different sectors may have different levels of opportunities (Industry Today, 2019).

In Myanmar, the two different types of employment can be observed as either employed (private or government staff) or self-employed status. Generally, the three sectors in the economy are known as manufacturing, trades and services. Again, there are various industries such as agriculture, livestock raising, construction, textile, transportation, and so forth. Additionally, many foreign companies are investing in Myanmar especially in oil and gases, energy, textile, hotel and tourism, consumers' products, pharmaceutical and banking sectors (Falzon, 2015). However, due to low pay with fewer opportunities locally, many youth are also working abroad.

*According to a recent small online survey among youth (62 valid respondents, 36 females and 26 males) by Thuta Nyana (TTNN) team (Annex), concerning their current employability, nearly two thirds of them (37/62) responded that it is difficult for them and only a few of them (8/62) think it is easy. The reasons given for the difficulty were poor opportunity due to political situation (24/37), poor network (15/37), insufficient capital (14/37), documents (13/37), insufficient skills (11/37), low salary (benefits) (9/37).*

## **TVET perspective**

### **Government and private TVET**

It is reported that Myanmar has 1 million school drop-out among youth annually. Nonetheless, only 10% of them are able to access vocational training (Kholheyer et al., 2013). For school drop-out youth, the government opens some technical and vocational education and training (TVET) schools in major cities. These training are intended to fulfil the labour market needs and increase the employment opportunities among such youth by equipping them with some essential work related skills. Under Department of Technical and Vocational Education and Training, Myanmar has 4 Government Technical Colleges, 24 Government Technical Institutes, 35 Government Technical High Schools, Singapore-Myanmar Vocational Training Institute (SMVTI), 1 Nyang Shwe Vocational Training Institute (NVTI), English Language Proficiency School (ELPS), Yatana Welding Training Centre (YWTC), School of Industrial Training and Education (SITE), and Food & Beverage Vocational Training Centre (F&BVTC) for vocational education and training (UNESCO, n.d.). Although some training schools have SEA regional level quality, some technical specialists pointed out that these government run TVET schools have limitations such as poor choices of courses, less progressive learning process, less responsive to the needs of labour market and the low acceptance by the public (UNESCO, 2019). Although it updated its TVET policy a few years ago, the full implementation is not observed yet. Again, very recently, the military regime tried to expand the availability of TVET by planning to open 55 Industrial, agriculture, and livestock schools for middle school level youth in 55 districts (Myanmar International Television, 2023). But the degree of compatibility of demand of the present labour market is still unknown.

During the COVID-19 period, these training schools were closed. Although some of them reopen after the military coup, their quality and popularity among youth is controversial.

*The TTNN survey indicates that slightly more than one third (24/62) of participants responded that they know the presence of both the government and private TVET/schools, while a lesser proportion of respondents (21/62) acknowledges the presence of private TVET/schools only. A small number (5/62) of respondents recognise only the presence of government TVET/schools. Almost one fifth (12/62) of the respondents do not know about TVET/schools in Myanmar. Out of respondents who know the existence of either government or private TVET/schools or both, more than three quarters (38/50) showed their interest to*



*attend those training/schools. More females were interested in TVET/schools than males. Types of TVET training/courses that they need most to attend were listed as accounting, air-con servicing, database, research, report writing, leadership, teaching, marketing and sale business, making cold drinks, medical, pharmacy, information technology, communication and facilitation, management skill, women rights, English language skill, computer skill, and life skill training.*

*The most common challenge to attend the TVET/school courses is reported as financial limitation in nearly a third of the respondents (10/38). Other challenges mentioned are unavailable time, low confidence in TVET/School courses, and inaccessibility.*

Again, Myanmar has various privately opened TVET schools and some are in collaboration with some INGO. However, their quality, applicability and degree of employability is still low. *The survey findings indicate that only a third of respondents (21/62) acknowledge the presence of private TVET/schools in the country.* Only a small number of private TVET centres<sup>1</sup> obtained the National Skill Standard Authority (NSSA) approval so far.

In brief, the current TVET system in Myanmar seems split among various ministries. Non-formal TVET programmes are also provided by private institutes and other unregulated informal training offered by companies and NGO. However, the share of all students in middle school education enrolled in vocational programmes is as low as 0.7% in 2018, while the figure of neighbouring countries were much higher, for instance, Bangladesh (8.6%), China (40%), India (2.6%), Laos (2.1%), and Thailand (23%). Again in Myanmar, the female students are also only 0.2% of total enrollment. Nearly half of students in the first year of their TVET studies did not pass the exam due to failure or dropping out. On top of that, the government expenditure on vocational education was reported within 0.03% to 0.06% of GDP in 2018/2019, similarly to Laos (0.03%) (Danish Trade Union Development Agency, 2022).

## **International and local immigration**

### **COVID-19, Coup and IPD**

After the military coup, due to armed conflicts between PDF/EAO and military in various parts of country, the number of the internally displaced persons (IDP), are soaring up to more than 1.5 million (UNHCR, 2023), especially more women and children, packed in rural areas (Figure 1).

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.nssa.gov.mm/en/info/tc-info>




Figure 4 The number of IDP in various regions of Myanmar (Data source: Myanmar UNHCR displacement overview 16 Jan 2023. UNHCR. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/98182>)

**48.3 million US\$**

**WFP's funding requirement in Myanmar by September 2022**

(Source: Myanmar Emergency (<https://www.wfp.org/emergencies/myanmar-emergency>))

### International migration

The Myanmar Census in 2014 indicated that more than 2 million Myanmar migrated abroad; the majority were in neighbouring countries like Thailand (more than 70%), Malaysia, China and Singapore. Others were in South Korea, Japan and Middle East countries such as Saudi, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, Oman, and Bahrain. Very small numbers could go as far as US, and European countries. Apart from few citizens migrating via various labour agents or government to government plan, most of them are through different illegal channels. Unaffordability, consuming more time, and no certainty for improved status are some challenges for them to use official channels (ILO, n.d). However, many young people have left their home country for better opportunities abroad especially after the coup (Promchertchoo, 2023).

International Organisation for Migration (IOM) (2022) estimated that between 20,000 to more than 40,000 Myanmar people would cross the Myanmar-Thai border monthly during 2021 despite the closure of the border.

Before the COVID-19 and coup, Myanmar had already shown an internal migration pattern. Apart from the impact of long term armed conflicts in some ethnic areas, the development of industries in various sectors in urban areas to attract rural people to urban migration are major reasons for internal migration. Nonetheless, inability to find an appropriate workplace and accommodation, forced labour, facing new cultural language, lack of legal documents, abuses by the brokers, and no proper protection of labour rights are well-acknowledged challenges for them (ILO, n.d.).

*More than two thirds of the survey respondents (43/62) have an interest in working abroad. More females (31/36) showed interest to work than those of male counterparts (12/26). Among females, Asia Pacific region (Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Australia etc.) are their choice (16/31) of countries and Western countries (US, UK, or Europe etc.) are preferred places to work by males (6/12). However, only more than a half (23/43) of the respondents reported they have initial preparation to go abroad. More males (8/12) are beginning to do something to go abroad than their female counterparts (12/31). Again among those who have an interest to go abroad, more than two thirds of them have some shortages like language skills (33/43), financial capital (30/43), work related skills (22/43), networks (20/43), and documents (18/43).*

### ***Opportunities and risk factors of migration***

At least 10% (4 million) of the Myanmar population are working abroad either illegally or legally (Kholheyer, Ferrari, Zaw, 2013). Many of them are in the working age group including youth. Higher pay and having a chance to learn and earn in abroad are some obvious advantages of working abroad. However, such migration is not without risks. For instance, illegal migration, risk of arrest, human trafficking, and sexual exploitations, especially children, women, and girls are reported challenges (U.S Department of State, 2022). With the recent suspension of issuing passports to Myanmar citizens by the military (The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2022a), the chances of illegal migration and various abuses by fake agents are heightened for Myanmar youth. More illegal migration and border passing especially to neighbouring countries such as Thailand, Malaysia and China are also foreseen. Arrest of dozens of Myanmar citizens for illegal border crossing has been reported on an almost daily basis in Thailand since the military coup (Chongcharoen, 2022) (UCAN, 2022).

## **Other opportunities**

### ***Agriculture and livestock raising***

Traditionally, Myanmar is an agricultural-based country. Its major labour workforce is found in the agricultural sector. However, its contribution is decreasing, only a third of GDP recently. Being highly resource-consuming and labour intensive with low income/yield, many

agricultural workers leave rural workplaces and move towards urban areas or external migration.

On top of that, after the military coup, because of volatile security status and human rights abuses reportedly, the agricultural works of many rural farmers are also disturbed. ILO also acknowledges that the Myanmar agricultural sector is much affected by the armed conflicts, unrest and volatile security (ILO, 2021). The decline in rice production is also expected for 2022 because of lower use of inputs, for example, fertilisers, due to higher prices and lower rainfall than a year before (IFPRI, 2022).

### ***Other sectors (MSME, Garment, Construction, Hotel and tourism)***

Not only agriculture, but other sectors such as infrastructure development, textile, travelling businesses, and tourism services were also much disturbed by the COVID-19 and coup. It also estimates that the loss of jobs is around one third in each sector (ILO, 2021). Although the government of Myanmar provided loans as a part of COVID recovery plan, micro, small and medium enterprise (MSME) sector is struggling with low demand and insufficient resources such as electricity and higher fuel cost and inflation and so forth (IFPRI, 2022). Service and trade sectors are also affected because of higher inflation and low consumers' purchasing power, disrupted logistics and supply chain, unstable foreign exchange policy, low production of major sectors such as agriculture and industries.

### ***Government employees***

In response to the impact of CDM<sup>2, 3</sup> of various government departments, the military issued the order to extend the age of retirement from 60 to 62 years in 2021 (Development Media Group, 2022), to retain its remaining work force as long as possible. New recruitment to replace those vacant positions of CDM staff is also initiated but the quality of those new recruits is also controversial and the fulfilling of all the vacant posts is unknown so far. Many youths are also reluctant to work as government staff under the current military regime. *Result of the TTNN survey showed that interestingly, no respondents (0/62) would like to work as government staff as their choice of job. The underlying reasons may be recent active CDM activities, resentment over the current de facto military regime, and unattractive salary among government employees. In majority of the respondents the preferred type of job is self-employed (49/62), or employed (private sector) (13/62).*

### ***Non-governmental sector***

#### **INGO/LNGO**

Working as a volunteer, part-time or permanent staff in many international non-governmental organisations (INGO), local non-governmental organisations (LNGO) or community based organisations (CBO) is fascinated among youth especially who are having certain educational achievements and volunteer/humanitarian spirit because of better pay and other various

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<sup>2</sup> The estimated number of CDM staff in the government sector is around 400,000 in early 2023.

(<https://teacircleoxford.com/politics/how-has-myanmars-military-stalled-collapse-from-cdm-inflicted-damages/>)

<sup>3</sup> Total nearly 30% of public servants took part in the CDM, according to the Myanmar military council.

(<https://www.thaipbsworld.com/myanmars-longest-lasting-civil-disobedience-movement/>)

allowances/benefits with frequent travelling to various states/regions and expandable social life. But the status of INGO/LNGO/CBO and volunteer groups under the military regime is not better than before. Even some suppression or behaviours of controlling them is also reported. By applying a more restricted new law on formation of NGOs in late 2022 make these organisations more difficult to stand and work freely as before (United Nations Human Rights, 2022).

International humanitarian aid, especially in working together with the Myanmar government, became more difficult after the coup due to the legitimacy issue of the military regime. However, the recent approval of 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) which includes BURMA ACT, with millions of US dollar in non-lethal aid to Myanmar by the US government (Eleven Media Group, 2022), is hopeful for the activities of INGO/LNGO/CBO through US AIDS funding in the very near future.

### **Private sector/Self employment**

By acknowledging the current status and needs, the military regime attempts to lift up the macro-economy by injecting billions of Myanmar Kyats into the various sectors, especially to agriculture and livestock raising (Myanmar International Television, 2022). Moreover, it also tries to improve the private sector (The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2022b) but the actual result is too early to be observed.

### ***Gaps and needs of Myanmar youth***

Some acknowledged long-term gaps and needs of Myanmar youth are low educational achievement, lack of market responsive employment skill, low knowledge on basic labour rights and in business. Difficult to get a loan with reasonable interest rate for an ordinary youth to establish own business is also a great challenge for those youth who would like to initiate their own business.

*Among the survey respondents, in responding to the needs for their choice of work, working skills (33/62), language skills (41/62), networking skills (34/62), financial capital (30/62), and documents (8/62) are reported. The financial needs among the respondents who would like to do self-employment businesses are more frequently reported (18/49) than those who would like to be employed in the private sector (2/13).*

## **Unforeseen future**

### ***Slow and partial recovering economic status***

The reports of the local and international agencies (The World Bank, 2022b) pointed out that the private sector dim and prospect is not good but it is gradually healed, not reaching to the status of pre-COVID-19 and coup so far.

Most updated report of the World Bank (2023) indicated that the GDP of Myanmar is expected to improve 3% for the third quarter of 2023, which is clearly 13% below its 2019 figure. Because of energy insufficiency, disturbance in transportation, and supply chain,

issues in trade and currency exchange, and unclear policy, the business sector is still away from fully recovery (Edward et al., 2023). Again, the report highlighted that the Myanmar economy will gradually grow if there is no more disruption in a couple of years. Especially the service sector, international travelling, may be slightly improved, but the domestic consumption, garment and food industry will show weak growth. Most promising sector is agricultural production and exporting such as rice and pulses.

Based on that report, it is implied that most promising sectors for the employment opportunities are in agricultural, service, and travelling sectors. Other less expected sectors are in manufacturing, garment, construction and food industry. This report is unable to provide the specific types of opportunities in such sectors because it may need a more in-depth exploring labour assessment survey.

### ***Insecure status lingering***

*In opinion of employment opportunities for youth in the near future (next 1 to 2 years) in Myanmar, nearly a half of the respondents (29/62) think that it will be worse. Only a fifth (13/62) of the respondents has a better image on it.*

The immediate future of employability among Myanmar youth is still despairing at the moment because of unstable security status, risk of travelling internally or externally, frequent disruption of communications, low educational achievement, fewer labour opportunities through TVET, risk of illegal international migration, and poor performance of local businesses including manufacturing, trade and service sectors.

On the other hand, the planned but delayed general election to be held by the ruling military (The Bangkok Post, 2023) and the recognition (legitimacy) and capability of the newly elected government of Myanmar may definitely have some impacts on the current gloomy state of unemployment among youth in Myanmar. If the political stability is hopefully back to normal during the coming five years and beyond, the opportunities will be more open again and better status than present.

## Abbreviations

ADB	Asia Development Bank
CBO	Community based organisations
CDM	Civil Disobedience Movement
EAO	Ethnic Armed Organisations
ELPS	English Language Proficiency School
F&BVTC	Food & Beverage Vocational Training Centre
GDP	Gross Domestic Production
IDP	Internally displaced persons
ILO	International Labour Organisation
INGO	International non-governmental organisations
LNGO	Local non-governmental organisations
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NGO	Non-governmental organisations
NLD	National League for Democracy
NSSA	National Skill Standard Authority
NUG	National Unity Government
NVTI	Nyang Shwe Vocational Training Institute
PDF	People's Defence Force
SEA	South-East Asia
SITE	School of Industrial Training and Education
SMVTI	Singapore-Myanmar Vocational Training Institute
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
YWTC	Yatana Welding Training Centre


## Annex

### Online survey findings on ‘Youth and Employment Opportunity’


During March 2023, the Thuta Nyana Research Services conducted an online survey titled, ‘Youth and Employment Opportunity’ using Google form. The questionnaire set was prepared by the Thuta Nyana team in bilingual (Myanmar and English languages) and published online through [Facebook page](#) and [Web page](#) of Thuta Nyana Co., Ltd. The survey period was from 20 February to 31 March 2023 (total 40 days). One person (any one, male or female above 15 years of age) was allowed to answer once the Google questionnaire online during that period.

#### Demographic data of respondents

Total **62 valid respondents (36 females and 26 males)** voluntarily participated the online survey during the survey period.




Although it was a small and non-representing sample, the respondents from 11 out of 15 **different States and Regions** took part in the survey including Yangon Region (16/62), Mon State (11/62), Rakhine State (8/62), Magwe Region (8/62), Kachin State (5/62), Shan State (4/62), Mandalay Region (2/62), Sagaing Region (1/62), Kayin State (1/62), Bago Region (1/62), Ayeyawaddy Region (1/62), and a few (4/62) from abroad.






The **age range of the respondents** was from 17 years (a female) to 55 years (a male). The **average age of all respondents** was 29 years (Standard deviation (SD), 8.19). The average age of female respondents (26 years, SD, 6.97) was slightly younger than that of male counterparts (32 years, SD, 8.65).




Their **educational level** was from Primary school level (1/62), High school level (12/62), College/University level (29/62) (the most common level) to Post-grad level (18/62) and a few (2/62), not mentioning their educational level.



### Employment


More than three quarters of the respondents (48/62) were **currently employed (including daily wage, part-time job or self-employed)**, and at least either employed (private sector) (32/48), self-employed (13/48) or employed (government sector) (3/48).




Their **types of jobs** were also as varied as NGO staff (6), Accountant (3), Local development staff/worker (3), Vender (3), Teacher (2), Factory worker (2), Program management staff (2), Health care staff (2), Casual labourer (2), Company staff (1), Medical doctor (1), Nurse (1), Health Educator (1), Community worker (1), Construction worker (1), Electric factory staff (1), Air-con service provider (1), Broker (1), Carpenter (1), Grocery (1), HR manager (1), Logistics & Supply Chain Management (1), Pharmaceutical (1), Researcher (1), Writer (1), Trader (1), Translator (1), Travel and tours (1), Warehousing & Distribution centre (1) and so forth. **The duration of current job of the employed respondents** is also ranged from one month to 15 years.

### Job skill training

Whether they **recognise the different TVET/schools in Myanmar**, slightly more than one third (24/62) responded that they know both government and private TVET/schools, while a lesser proportion of respondents (21/62) acknowledge the presence of private TVET/schools. Only a small number (5/62) of respondents know the presence of government TVET/schools. Nearly one fifth of the respondents (12/62) do not know about TVET/schools in Myanmar.



Out of 50 respondents who know at least one of government or private TVET/school or both, more than three quarters (38/50) showed **their interest to attend those training/schools**. More females (25/30) were interested in TVET/schools than males (13/20).




**Types of TVET training/courses that they need most to attend** were listed as accounting, air-con servicing, database, research, report writing, leadership, teaching, marketing and sale business, making cold drinks, medical, pharmacy, information technology, communication and facilitation, management skill, women rights, English language skill, computer skill, and life skill training. The most common **challenge to attend the TVET/school courses** is reported as financial limitation, in nearly a third (10/38) of the respondents. Other challenges mentioned are unavailable time, low confidence in TVET/School courses, and inaccessibility.

The reported **most preferred type of job** in the majority of the respondents (49/62) is self-employed and employed (private sector) (13/62). Interestingly, no one would like to work as government staff as their choice of job. In responding to **their needs for getting a job**, working skills (33/62), language skills (41/62), networking skills (34/62), financial capital (30/62), and documents (8/62) are reported. The financial needs among the respondents who would like to do self-employment businesses are more frequently reported (18/49) than those who would like to be employed in private sector (2/13).


### Migration

More than two thirds of the respondents (43/62) have **an interest in working abroad**. More females (31/36) showed interest to work than those of male counterparts (12/26). Among females, Asia Pacific region (Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Australia etc.) are their choice (16/31) of countries and Western countries (US, UK, or Europe etc.) are **preferred places to work** by males (6/12). However, slightly more than a half (23/43) of the respondents reported they **have initial preparation for working abroad**. More males (8/12) are beginning to do something to go abroad than their female counterparts (12/31). Again, among those who have an interest to go abroad, more than two thirds of them have some shortage like language skills (33/43), financial capital (30/43), work related skills (22/43), networks (20/43), and documents (18/43).




### Perception/Expectation

When exploring their **perception on their current employability**, nearly two thirds of them (37/62) responded that it is difficult and only a few of them (8/62) think it is easy. At least a quarter of them have no comment on it (16/62). **The reasons given for the difficulty** were poor opportunity due to political situation (24/37), poor network (15/37), insufficient capital (14/37), documents (13/37), insufficient skills (11/37), low salary (benefits) (9/37).



More than half of the respondents (36/62) perceive that it is difficult **to obtain a desired job at the moment**. High proportions of males (16/26) think it is difficult for them to get a preferred job at present than their female counterparts (20/36). **In opinion of employment opportunity for youth in near future (next 1 to 2 years) in Myanmar**, nearly a half of the respondents (29/36) think that it will be worsen, higher proportion of males (14/26) than female counterpart (15/36) has negative view on it Only a fifth (13/62) of the respondents has a better image on it. But a few (10/62) have no comment on it.

### Opinion on employment opportunity for youth in near future (next 1 to 2 years) in Myanmar



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